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INTRODUCTION

The executlve-adfflinistratlve branch of Montana government is an
extremely complex arrangement*

Several factors contribute to the

plexity of Montana’s administrative organization.

coiih

The principal fac

tors are, the existence of several elected executive officials in
addition to the governor, the reliance on boards and commissions for
administrative purposes, and the growth in number of unrelated admin
istrative units.
It is the purpose of this thesis to describe the executive
system and to explore and analyze the three major attempts to reorgan
ize the system.

To conduct this analysis, a model administrative plan

has been constructed to be used as an analytical and comparative tool.
This model plan represents a logical and integrated executive system
based upon administrative theory and practice.
In developing a model plan for a single branch of state govern
ment it is easy to neglect consideration of the other two branches of
the government.

Development of a model plan presupposes a commi.tment

to reorganization.

Reorganization however, is a composite procedure,

taking into account the interrelationship of the legislative, judicial
and executive branches.

Aiqr broad attempt at reorganization of

Montana’s state government must consider the problems present in the
legislative and judicial branches as well as the problems in the execu
tive branch.
This thesis is restricted to a study of Montana’s executive
organization.

It is predicated upon the basic assumption that the
i
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present executive-administrative structure in Montana is inferior to
structures found in other states and to systems advocated by both
students and practitioners of state government.

Underlying this basic

assumption is the writer's belief that executive authority must be comrmensurate with executive responsibility.

In state government the

governor should have authority to administer the laws and he should be
commensurably accountable to the people for that administration.
Authority and responsibility for executive action should be centered
in the governor.
Montana's executive branch is characterized ly the diffusion of
executive authority and responsibility among several elected executive
officials and among many boards and commissions.

This diffusion is a

result of the historical period during which the State of Montana
became a political reality.
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CHAPTER I
ADMINISTRATION GROWTH AND THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT

At the close of the nineteenth century, the prevailing theory
of the state executive was the offspring of Jacksonian democracy.
President Jackson represented the frontier farmers and the new labor
ing class.

Jackson advocated the idea that the legislature represented

the interests of the old aristocracy, while the executive was a repre
sentative of all the people.

"As Jackson fought with the Congress and

the Supreme Court, the chief executive became the champion of the
people in the ^ es of the people."^

As a result of the Jacksonian

image of the chief executive, a movement began in the states to
strengthen the chief executive.

The colonial fear of the governor

began to dissipate.
Jackson's argument that long retention of officials in office
was detrimental to good government found expression in his advocacy of
rotation.

According to Jackson, officialdom must be changed after

each election.

The states altered this concept of rotation in office

and instituted the practice of filling state administrative offices ty
election.

If the governor was truly the representative of the entire

electorate, officialdom could also be made responsive by allowing only

^Allan R. Richards, "The Traditions of Government in the States,"
The Fortv-Elght States; Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administra
tors (Harriman, New York: The American Assembly, Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University, 1955), p. 45*
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those persons receiving the mandate of the people to serve in office.^
This movement for the popular election of administrative officials grew
until the usual procedure in the state was to elect a governor, lieu
tenant governor, a secretary of state, an attorney general, and a
treasurer.

Thus, the voter was faced with the so-called long ballot,

consisting of mauy elected executive, judicial, and administrative
officials. As a result of this practice the dominant role of the legis
lature declined.

There was, however, no corresponding increase in the

power of the governor.

Instead, the legislature's dominance was replaced

primarily by the voter, rather than by the chief executive.3 Supreme
executive power was now diffused among several elected officials.

Either

as members of boards or an individuals, these officers were charged with
the administration of state government.

The role of the governor as

the responsible officer for executing the laws and administering the
state activities was now being played by several actors simultaneously.
In addition to multiplicity of elected executive officials,
another political phencMenon appeared in the executive branch.

This

was the concept of citizen control of state administration by means of
boards and commissions rather than by appointed administrators.
also produced a tendency toward the diffusion of executive power.

It
As

Lipson points out in this regards
Similar problems are presented by the existence of boards and
commissions. Prior to reorganization the states were 'cmmissioned

^Ibid.
% o r k Villbern, "Administration in State Government,* The FortyEight States t Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators (Harriman,
Hew lorki The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia
University, 1955), p. 115.
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to death,* and the governor had inadequate power of

control, 4-

The main argument for the introduction of boards and commissions
as executive bodies was that a board will keep politics out of an
administrative agency.

It was argued that if the governor was allowed

to select an agency or department head, administration would suffer due
to the political ties implicit in such an appointment*

According to

Lipson the remedy was:
Place at the top, a board, whose members are appointed by the
governor for long overlapping terms* The board acts as a 'buffer*
between the governor and the executive head * . * this argument
and the fear which prompts it, is similar to the motives of the
long ballot advocates.^
A second argument for the board and commission form of government was
continuity*

When the membership of boards and ccsnmissions were appointed

for long overlapping terms, it was felt that "their collective experience
would be preserved."^

Another argument was that a group decision was

superior to the decision of any single individual; wisdom would reign
in a council of minds*

The advocates of commission government also felt

that a department would serve the public best if representatives of
effected groups and sections made the decisions.
Executive power at the close of the nineteenth century was thus
characterized by diffusion.

The many elected officials executing admin

istrative functions and making administrative policy decisions contrib
uted to this diffusion*

111,:

Employment of boards and commissions for

^Leslie Lipson, The Governor from Figure Head to Leader (Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 182,
5lbid*, p* 183.
6lbid*. p* 184*
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administrative purposes spread the executive function among still more
Individuals.

The governor was the chief executive In name only.

His

power lay primarily In the degree to which he could exercise his politi
cal prowess.

Montana
It was In this atmosphere that the executive branch of Montana
state government was created.

When the Montana Constitutional Conven

tion met In 1889 to draft a constitution and erect a government for the
new state ^ the concepts of elected administrators and diffused executive
power were. Indeed, present.

The executive branch of Montana government

was conceived as an executive department.^

Within this department the

executive power was to be diffused between seven elected officials:

a

governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state,
treasurer, a superintendent of public instruction, and a state auditor,
all of whom were to be elected by the people for four-year terms.®
The multl-headed executive concept was not the result of the
Montana convention*s Ingenuity.

It was In keeping with the prevailing

concept of state government and the article erecting the executive
department was drawn almost exclusively from the Colorado Constitution.9
Dispersal of the executive power left the governor In a somewhat
anomalous position.

The adopted constitution stated that:

"The supreme

"^Montana, Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 2.

®ibia.
9Elbert F. Allen, Sources of the Montana State Constitution
(unpublished paper compiled by Frank Woody. Library, Montana State
University), p. 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
executive power of the state shall be vested in the governor, who shall
see that the laws are faithfully executed.
However, the members of the convention did not seriously believe
the governor would actually act in this lofty role.
Mr. Collins of Cascades I think in the first place that the office
of Governor is more ornament than anything else. The duties are
less than that of any other officer mentioned in this section, and
the compensation should be in accordance with the duties performed.
The Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, or Superin
tendent of Public Instruction, either one of them, do a great deal
more work— two or three times more work and some of them ten times
more work than the Legislative assembly will ever impose upon the
Governor.11
This statement was made regarding a proposal to reduce the salary of the
governor.

No objection was raised to Mr, Collins* conception of the

governor's office; it was felt that although the governor was not going
to be burdened with work, he would have to entertain visiting officials.
If his salary was too low, only a rich man could possibly afford the
governorship.12
This ostensible concurrence in an inactive role for the governor
was accompanied by several provisions further emasculating the supreme
executive power of the governor.

Notable among these was the provision

establishing the Board of Examiners .13

iPMontana, Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 5.
llMontana, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. Helena
Montana, 1889, p. 442.
12
Proceedings. pp. A42-443.
l^Note: This body is established in Article VII, Section 20
of the Constitution as adopted. Mr. Allen was unable to discover the
exact origin of this section (Allen, p. 4)* Oregon has a similar board
however (Lipson, pp. 336-337).
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This board passes on all financial claims against the state.

The

board consists of the governor, attorney general, and the secretary of
state.

Here, the executive control over matters financial Is diffused

among two other members of the executive department.
Another example of this concept of executive power related to the
pardoning power of the governor.

The Constitution provided that:

The governor shall have the power to grant pardons absolute or
conditional . . . .
However, the section goes on to say that the governor has this power
except that:
Before granting pardons, remitting fines and forfeitures, or
commuting punishments, the action of the governor concerning same
shall be approved by a board, or a majority thereof, composed of
the secretary of state, attorney general and state auditor, who
shall be known as the board of pardons.^
Here, also the executive power was divided among the members of the
executive department and the "supreme executive power" of the governor
reduced accordingly.
The members of the convention erected the multiple executive.
They charged the governor with the responsibility of executing and
administering the laws of the state, but In actuality placed the authority
for that execution In hands of all seven members of the executive depart
ment.
Generally, the convention delegates felt that state services
should be administered by boards and commissions.

Some boards were to

be presided over by the elected members of the executive department.
Other boards were to be appointed by the governor.

As state functions

^Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 9»
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increased, there was a corresponding increase in the nnmber of boards
and commissions to administer these services.
There are numerous ex officio boards upon which members of the
executive department serve.

The number of these boards has increased

greatly as new services were added.

In 1890 there were five ex officio

boards ; in 1953 there were fourteen.
In addition to these ex officio boards, combination ex officio
and appointive boards have increased from none in 1890 to twenty-nine
in 1953.

Strictly appointive boards Increased from two in 1890 to

twenty-seven in 1953.^^
A compilation of all boards and offices in 1953 resulted in a
total of 135.

As Dr. Renne points out, *The state administrative

machinery is far from a simple structure and the chief executive or
governor of "üie state has a difficult job working out a smoothly func
tioning and well coordinated administration."^7
These boards and commissions have grown with the state; as new
functions were added by the legislature new agencies were erected to
deal with them.

Little attention seems to have been paid to the idea

of incorporating additional functions into existing units of adminis
tration.

Nineteen separate boards are engaged in examining and licensing

^^David Smith, An Outline of the Development and Growth of State
Administration in Montana 1890-1953 (unpublished research paper, Library,
Montana State University), Table No. 1.

l^Ibid.
^^Roland R. Renne, The Government and Administration of Montana
American Commonwealth Series, ed. W. Brooks Graves (New York; Thomas
I. Crowell Company, 1958), p. 89.
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individuals for various vocations and

professions.

IS Financial duties

are carried on by six boards and one commission, included here are the
State Depository Board, the State Board of Equalization, the State Board
of Examiners, the State Board of Supplies, the State Insurance Commis
sion, and the State Furnishing

Board.

^9

Twenty-three boards and commissions or councils are engaged in
public health and welfare activities.

There are twenty-one boards and

commissions participating in various ways in the education of the people
of Montana.

Some twenty boards and commissions are engaged in activities

relating to the development and control of natural resources of Montana.
In addition there are some eight other boards and commissions covering
such diverse activities as athletics and aeronautics.^®
Most of these boards and commissions are made up of citizens who
are not salaried state officials.

Many of the boards and commissions

have only three members but range in membership as high as fifteen.^^
A rather large share of the governor's time is required in attempting
to fill these positions on the many boards and agencies.

In 1890 the

governor appointed thirty-eight people to staff his administrationj due
to the prevalence of the board and commission concept of administration
in Montana, the governor, in 1953# had to select personnel for 287
positions.

l^Ibid.. p. 106.
19ibid.. pp. 108-109.

ZOlbid.
^^Ibid.. pp. 105-106.
^^Smith, p. 2.
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The Reorganization MovamAnt
Other states also found growth to be a problem.

Administrative

machinery to deal with new activities increased with each legislative
session.

Perhaps one of the most striking illustrations of this growth

in state activities is shown in terms of expenditures.

In 1913 the

total cost of operating all the states amounted to only $378 million.
State expenditures in 1955, however, were nearly $16 billion.23
Accompanying this growth was a feeling that perhaps the new
services were not being administered economically or efficiently.

This

feeling began rather early in the twentieth century and has continued
to the present.

As state services and the facilities for their admin

istration increased, people began to express a new interest in the study
of governmental organization:
In the early 1900 *s a group of man centering around the newly
organized Bureau of Municipal Research in New York City had begun
to feel goverment was sufficiently similar everywhere (at least
in the United States) to nermit certain generalizations about the
goals of administration.24
A movement for reorganization began in 1909*

The Peoples Power

League of Oregon published a proposal in 1909 and again in 1910 for
reorganizing the executive branch of that state, concentrating the
executive power in the governor.
On January 5, 1910, Governor Charles £. Hughes of New York

^^Harold F. Alderfer, American Local Government and Administra
tion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 171.
2^The Council of State Governments, ReorganizingState Govern
ment (Chicago, 1950), p. 2.
23a . £. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the
United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 6.
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suggested a solution to the problem of administration in his wrmngi
message to the state legislature.
It would be an Improvement, I believe, in state administration if
the executive responsibility were centered in the governor who
should appoint a cabinet of administrative heads accountable to
him and charged with the duties now imposed upon elected officials.
In 1911 President Taft*s Commission on Economy and Efficiency
was established to study administrative reorganization at the national
level.

The Taft commission (though not particularly successful in

attaining reorganization at the federal level) did advance the idea that
problems of administrative organization could be studied in a systematic
fashion.

This was Immediately appealing to the states.27

New York was one of the first to study its administrative system
and maiqr new recommendations were included in a series of proposed
constitutional revisions which were defeated at the polls in 1915.
Massachusetts and New Jersey also set up commissions for studying execu
tive functions.
By 1917 there had been extensive reorganization studies conducted
in fifteen states, and Illinois, under Governor Frank 0. Lowden, adopted
an extensive statuatory reorganization plan.2^ Fifteen states had
adopted reorganization measures by 1925.

The movement continued through

the 1920's and 1930's and at the beginning of World War II approximately
thirty states had effected substantial

reorganization.

29

26cited in Buck, pp. 6-7.
27nie Council of State Governments, p. 2.
^^Buck, p. 7.
29willbern, p. 113.
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Since the Second World War the results of reorganization attempts
have been very modest.

By 1953 there had been postwar studies in twenty-

four states; however, legislative adoption of the reccxmendations was
limited.^°
With some exceptions and qualifications the general temper of the
reorganization proposals and plans in all the states was to emphasize
the.governor's responsibilities and attempt to give him authority com
mensurate with those responsibilities.
Montana has had no extensive reorganization along these lines.
However, there has been, from time to time, a feeling that perhaps the
plural executive, commission type of administration was not the proper
kind of administrative organization for the state.

Joseph M. Dixon, who

became governor in 1921, expressed this attitude rather candidly as
early as 1919s
It is my opinion that in order to strike at the root of the present
difficulty in the way of coordinating the various branches of the
state government that a constitutional amendment is necessary.
The governor of the state, as the responsible executive, should
have the right to name the purely administrative Z!sic7 state
officers, in exactly the same way as the president names his
responsible cabinet.
Good government comes from placing full responsibility in the hands
of the fewest administrative officers possible and then holding
the appointing power responsible for their individual actions. To
my mind it is not possible to have effective government, as long
as responsibility is scattered throughout a dozen different heads,
each of whom has equal power in the matter of determining policy.
Our present administrative state government is a veritable patch
work of pieced-on boards, with overlapping duties and responsi
bilities . . . .21

30lbid.. p. 113.
2lLetter from Joseph M. Dixon to Frank Eliel, June 11, 1919,
Collected Papers, Montana State and Territory, Efficiency and Trade
Commission, 1919, Montana State University Library, microfilm.
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This feeling led to the establishment, in 1919, of the State Efficiency
and Trade Commission.

This commission had two primary functions,

First,

it was to study the government of Montana and make recommendations
which would promote efficiency and econoiqy.

The second function had to

do with an investigation of commercial activities in the state.
A second major study of Montana's governmental system was started
in 1941.

The legislature created the Governor's Committee on Reorgani

zation and Economy and authorized the governor, with the aid of a
citizen advisory committee and a consulting firm, to make a comprehen
sive study of the entire organization and structure of Montana govern
ment.

This committee was allocated $20,000 and employed Griffenhagen

and Associates, a professional governmental consulting organization, to
conduct the study.

The extensive study made by this group resulted in

a voluminous report published in 1943.
In 1951 the Commission on Reorganization of the State Government
of the State of Montana was established.
of state legislators.

This commission was composed

The commission was delegated authority to make

recommendations for reorganizing Montana government.

In cooperation

with the Montana Taxpayers Association, the commission employed an
executive director to conduct its study.

In 1953 the commission sub

mitted its report to the legislative assembly.
The Model
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze these three major
reorganization studies conducted in Montana with regard to their con
formity with, or departure from, the generally accepted principles of
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administrative organization for state g o v e r n m e n t , I n order to system
atically analyze the work of the three studies, it is necessary to con
struct a model administrative organization based upon these accepted
p r i n c i p l e s . T h e model here proposed is based upon what A. E. Buck
calls the "integrated type of administrative organization" as opposed
to the present Montana system or the "conmission or plural executive
type.
The executive branch of government is responsible for administer
ing the functions performed by the governmentj it should be organized
to perform its duty effectively and efficiently and it should be politi
cally responsible for the performance of that duty.

To achieve this

objective it is necessary to have a short ballot, that is, elect only
two officials from the same party to the executive branch, a governor
and lieutenant governor, and place the power to direct in one of thennthe governor.

When the authority for the performance of executive

functions is diffused among several elected officials, administrative
conflicts result.

Conflict is likely when these elected officials are

members of different political parties.
The history of Montana is crowded with cases of political division
in the executive department.

In the eighteen elections held between

1889 and 1956, the seven elected officials of the state have been of

^^illbern, p. 114.
^^This model is based primarily on the principles embodied in
Chapters I and II of Beorganizinsf State Government. Council of State
Governments, o p . cit.. pp. 1-67.
^^Buck, p. 29.
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the same party affiliation only seven t i m e s , I n 1956, for example,
the governor and superintendent of public instruction were Republicans}
the other five elected officials were Democrats.

In the eleven elections

in which there was a political division, the governor has been in a
minority seven t i m e s P o l i t i c a l division may have significant conse- ,
quences for administration if the elected officials jointly constitute
an important administrative board.
The Montana Board of Examiners made up of the governor, secretary
of state, and the attorney general has extensive financial control over
state activities; it has been said that the board;
constitutes a triple-headed executive system."^

" . . . in reality
Political division on

this board may result in great difficulty for the governor to maintain
any control over the policies of the board.

The fact that all the menH

bers of the board presumably have the mandate of the people encourages
them to act somewhat independently even when political unity obtains.
In connection with this specific board Leslie Lipson has written:
. . . This board has great power and holds frequent meetings. A
former attorney general of the state told the writer that the
governor by no means rules the board. The triumverate indulges
_
in *trading' and 'logrolling, ' and the governor may be overruled.*^
A short ballot would eliminate this diffused type of adminis
trative mechanism.

The short ballot is not without precedent.

In

addition to the federal government, several states also use this system.

^^Compiled from Renne, p. 112.
^^Compiled from Renne, p. 112.
37lbid.. p. 113.
^^Llpson, pp. 36-37.
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In New Jersey, for example, the governor is the only publicly elected
member of the administrative branch of the state.^9

Alaska also has a

short ballot, the only elected officials in the executive branch are the
governor and the secretary of state,40
Another and integral part of the model is the idea of departmental
consolidation.

This plan involves the consolidation of all administra

tive agencies into a small number of departments organized by function.
The purpose of functional integration is to eliminate overlapping,
duplication, and to define the authority and scope of the directing
head.

A large number of unrelated agencies making up the administrative

structure leads to divided responsibility.
In addition to the grouping of agencies into departments on a
uni-functional basis, the heads of all departments should be appointed
by, and responsible to, the governor.

Department heads should be

appointed on the basis of their integrity and ability.

In order to

insure their responsibility to the governor they should serve at his
pleasure.

The governor's power of appointment and removal tends to

identify those responsible for the action or inaction in the administra
tion. 4^
Another and important part of the model concerns the elimination
of boards and commissions for purely administrative tasks.

Multi-headed

^^Bennett M. Rich, The Government and Administration of New
Jersey. American Commonwealths Series, ed. V.Brooke Graves (Newïorkî
Thomas I. Crowell Company, 1957), p. 85.
4Qrhe Constitution of Alaska Adopted February 5, 1956 (Fairbanks,
AlaskaÎ Commercial Printing Co.), pp. 13-14»
4^Buck, p. 17,
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agencies divide responsibility and contribute to indecision.

Single

administrators should direct the operative affairs of an administrative
agency.
Where citizen interest is great or where a council of mindm is
felt necessary, advisory boards can be erected.

However, advisory

boards should in no way be allowed authority or responsibility for the
actual direction of operations.

If an agency performs functions pri

marily of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature, a plural
headed agency should be Instituted.

This type of administrative body

should be integrated as closely as possible into the executive branch
and should be appointed by the governor,
Another important tenet of this model administrative organization
is to complement the governor *s powers with the authority to require
reports and investigate administrative activities.
Accompanying the above mentioned control functions, the governor
should have the necessary staff instruments.

The governor should have

an adequate personal office staff, including adequate clerical help,
advisors, and administrative assistants.
The appointed department heads should be organized in a governor's
cabinet.

Collective discussion of the problems confronting all the

agencies would promote better coordination of the state's administra
tive apparatus.
A central budgeting agency with the authority to prepare an
executive budget should be included in the governor's staff group.
Another fiscal agency required is a central accounting office
to set up the accounting system for the state.

It should also allot
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appropriations, settle claims, and make a pre-audit of a U expenditures.
This office also should be responsible to the governor.
Central purchasing is an additional staff service that the
governor should have.

This office should obtain and distribute supplies

for various state activities.

Quantity purchasing on a bid basis

reduce the item cost of supplies used commonly in state agencies,
A central personnel office with a sound merit system should be
linked to the governor's office.

Stressing the principles of civil

service at the federal level, this agency should attempt to recruit and
retain qualified personnel for the entire state administration.
The final agency attendant to the governor's staff contingent
is a planning agency.

This staff unit should be instituted to research

and evaluate state programs with regard to coordination, trends, and
possible future administrative needs.
The final part of the model is designed to provide the legisla
ture with a tool for surveillance over the executive branch.

A means

for control over the fiscal operations of the executive department can
be provided for by the establishment of an independent auditor.

This

auditor should have the authority to require of the executive branch all
information needed to conduct a post-audit of the state's expenditures.
This officer would be entirely responsible to legislature— not to the
governor.
The governor and his subordinates must be responsible and account
able to the people and the legislature for the conduct of the executive
branch.

However, as the Hoover Commission found in investigating the

executive branch of the federal government in 1949:
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Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority_
the power to direct. The exercise of authority is impossible without
a clear line of responsibility and accountability frcm the bottom
to the top. The wise exercise of authority is impossible without
the aids which staff institutions can provide to assemble facts
and recommendations upon the execution of decisions.^
The state governments of New Jersey and Alaska approximate the
structure of this model.

Alaska is perhaps closer than New Jersey.

In

Alaska the executive appoints the heads of a small number of departments
(according to the constitution, the number of departments shall never
exceed twenty); the department heads are responsible to the governor and
serve at his pleasure.

In addition, the constitution provides that

operating agencies be organized by function into major purpose depart
ments.^^
In summary, the model plan contains these principles:
1.

Shorten the ballot and place the power to direct the state
administration in a single executive officer— the governor.
In this way both the responsibility and authority for action
are centered and identifiable.

2.

Consolidate administrative agencies into a small number of
departnents, organized by function, to prevent overlapping
and duplication of services.

3.

The heads of these uni-functional departments should be
appointed by the governor and should serve at his pleasure.

^The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, General Management of the Executive Branch, a report to
Congress, February, 194-9 (Washington, D. C.: Ü..S. Government Printing
Office, 1949), p. 1.
43Alaska, Constitution.
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4.

Single heads should direct the affairs of administrative
agencies.

Boards and commissions should be eliminated from

purely administrative tasks.
5.

Staff services should be placed at the disposal and under
the control of the governor.

Included among these services

are:
a)

The authority of the governor to require reports.

b)

Â personal office staff for the governor including
adequate clerical help, advisors, and administrative
assistants.

c)

A governor *3 cabinet composed of the appointed depart
ment heads.

d)

A central budget agency to prepare an executive budget.

e)

A central accounting agency to set up a uniform account
ing system for the state.

This agency should allot

appropriations, settle claims, and make a pre-audit of
all state expenditures.
f) A central purchasing agency should be established.
g)

There should be a central personnel agency linked to
the governor’s office, stressing the principles of civil
service found at the federal level of government.

h)

A planning agency should be instituted to engage in
research and to evaluate administrative programs.

6.

An independent post-audit of the state’s financial affairs
should be conducted by an auditor responsible to the
legislature.
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Some of these principles have been embraced by each of the three
reorganization studies conducted in Montana.

For various reasons, how

ever, extensive changes along the lines suggested in the model have not
been made in the executive-administrative system of Montana.

In the

succeeding chapters a survey of each of these reorganization groups and
their work is undertaken.

The principles embodied in the model will be

applied to the proposals offered by these reorganization groups in order
to determine each group *s conception of the executive-administrative
branch of Montana government and how these conceptions differ from the
generally accepted principles of admihistration.
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CHAPTER II
THE STATE EFFICIENCY AND TRADE COMMISSION OF 1919
As the functions, equipment, and expenditures of state govern
ment began to increase, questions were raised concerning the adequacy
of Montana's performance.

Consideration was given to the idea of study

ing Montana's administrative facility to determine the presence or
absence of a businesslike approach to the administration of state
affairs*

In 1919, the Sixteenth Legislative Assembly created the three

member State Efficiency and Trade Commission.

The three members of the

Commission were Frank Eliel, the chairman, N. T. Lease, and W. 0, Fisk,
This Commission was delegated the authority to study the administra
tive structure of Montana government and offer recommendations for
change in that structure to promote economy and efficiency.

The other

purpose of the Commission was to investigate commercial combinations
allegedly engaged in fixing prices within the state.
The Conmission was charged with the responsibility of setting up
a budget plan and preparing a budget for submission to the Seventeenth
Legislative Assembly in 1921.^

The Board of Examiners was originally

responsible for preparing the 1921 budget, but, lacking facilities and
funds, the task was delegated to the Commission.

The Commission

employed Tanner, Gilman and Ellis, an accounting firm from Chicago, to
construct a budget system and outline a plan for a uniform system of

Montana, Report of the State Efficiency and Trade Commission
Rendered on November 1. 1919. to Governor S. V. Stewart, p. 59.
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accounting in the 8tate.^
In addition to the budget plan, Tanner and Gilman drew up organi
zation charts showing the administrative structure of several states.
These plans were designed to provide the Commission with a working
knowledge of the various organization patterns then existing in other
state governments.^
Supplementing the work of Tanner and Gilman, N. T. Lease, a
member of the Commission, toured several states and inspected their
respective administrative systems.^

In addition, the Commission members

made a general survey of Montana's executive-administrative organiza
tion*

The Commission's recommendations were based upon the work of

Tanner and Gilman, Lease, and the Commission survey.
Generally, the Commission was interested in centralizing state
administration and reducing the amount of work required of each elected
officer.

After studying the activities of the several officers, offices,

and boards, making up the administration of Montana, the Commission
became aware of the decentralized character of the state's administra
tive structure.
The Commission determined that the elected members of the execu
tive department were subject to extensive and time-consuming membership
on numerous boards and commissions*

The governor, the Commission

^Minutes and Papers of Efficiency and Trade Commission, Col
lected Papers, Montana State and Territory (Montana State University
Library), microfilm.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.. Minutes of June 4, 1919.
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conclxidad, was excessively burdened by his required membership on twelve
different boards and commissions.

Because of his participation on

these boards, the Commission felt that it was physically Impossible for
the governor adequately to perform the other duties of his office.^
Discussing the office of attorney general, the Commission pointed
out that the people of the state elected a person to this office on
the basis of his legal ability, not on the basis of his abilities as
an administrator.

The duties of the office, encompassing membership

on mazqr administrative boards and commissions, were primarily of an
administrative nature.

As a result of this analysis, the Commission

recommended that the attorney general be relieved of his membership
upon these boards and concern himself with the legal aspects of his
office.^

The Commission did not, however, draft a bill to implement

this recommendation as it would have entailed extensive constitutional
revision.
In connection with the analysis of the elected officials of the
executive department, the Commission also studied the activities of
the many state administrative boards.

The Commission believed that

there were too many agencies erected to deal with increased state
activities.

They felt that consolidation of agencies into departments

would be of great benefit to the administrative organization of the
state :
A new office or bureau is frequently created to perform a function
closely related to the work already being done by an existing

^Report, pp. 4-5.
^Ibid.. p. 5.
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office or bureau, and instead of creating a new office or bureau,
the Legislature should have provided for the necessary extension
of power of an existing office.'
The Commission recommended that six boards having to do with agricultural
activities

be consolidated into a department of agriculture under a

single head appointed by the governor.®

Also, the Commission recommended

that the Industrial Accident Board, the Bureau of Labor and Industry,
and The B o ^ d of Arbitration and Conciliation be combined into a Depart
ment of Labor.

In the case of these proposed departments, no constitu

tional limitation was evident and the Commission drafted bills to con
solidate these agencies.9
The Commission, commending the idea of consolidation, was
impressed with the cabinet plan of government recently adopted in
Illinois.

There, boards were consolidated into departments with single

heads appointed by the governor and coordinated in a governor's cabinet.
However, the Commission believed that the adoption of this system by
Montana was impractical on two grounds.

First, the Commission con

cluded that the cabinet form of government, though well established in
the business world, had not been tested for sufficient time in state
government to merit adoption in Montana.

A second conclusion was that

the inauguration of the cabinet system in Montana government would
involve extensive amendment to the constitution.

The obstacles created

by the existence of constitutional boards, commissions, and officers

7 Ibid.. p. 53.
®Ibid.. p. 112.
^Ibid.. p. 161.
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were considered by the Commission to be insuperable.^^ Underlying both
reasons was a general reluctance to eliminate any of the elected offices
or to institute any "spectacular or revolutionary changes.
Intensive attention was, of course, given to the important
Montana State Board of Examiners.

The Board of Examiners was (and is)

responsible for much of the state's financial administration.

In

addition to a monthly accounting of state funds the Board of Examiners
had charge of planning and erecting buildings, purchasing all furnish
ings for the state, awarding contracts, preparing a budget, and examin
ing all claims against the state.

The Commission discovered that the

number of claims alone amounted to twelve or fourteen hundred a month.
The volume of work falling upon this agency was too great, the Commis
sion reasoned, for the members (the governor, attorney general, and
secretary of state) to exercise proper control of the duties and perform,
at the same time, the other activities connected with their respective
elected offices.^
After thorough study the Commission came to the realization that
the administration of Montana was less than adequate.

They asserted

that the administration was incapable of dealing effectively with
increasing state activities.

Boards or commissions, made up of elected

and appointed officials, were not considered desirable for administra
tive purposes.

Speaking specifically of the Board of Examiners' role

in state affairs, the Commission observed*

"The manner of handling

^^Ibld., p. 52.
l^Ibld., p. 51.
^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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the state's business was effective and satisfactory during the infancy
of the state, but we believe that it is rapidly being outgrown.
On July 31, 1919, the Cœnmission presented a partial report of
its investigations to the governor.

(The reason for this incomplete

report was the sudden convening of the extraordinary legislative session
of 1919 to deal with the problems of drought in the state and to act
on the woman's suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution.)

The

primary proposal in this partial report was a recommendation for reform
of the executive-administrative organization of the state.

Essentially

the Commission was concerned with centralizing the "business affairs"
of the state.

The Commission maintained that centralized control of

the state administration would fix responsibility in fewer hands, allow
the elected officials more time for their elected offices, and promote
efficiency.
The proposal for centralizing state administration was based on
the Commission's analysis of administrative reforms adopted in other
states during the early 1900's.

The Commission's proposed State Board

of Administration represented a kind of synthesis of these reforms.
This plan consisted of a three-man board appointed by the governor.

The

board would take over the work of the Board of Examiners relating to
the audit of claims, purchases, preparation of the budget, and control
of the charitable, penal, and educational institutions of the state. ^

^3Ibid.. p. 162,
^^Ibid.. p. AS.
15Ibid.. p. A2.
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The creation of a Board of Administration was also an attempt
to give fiscal control to the governor.

Gubernatorial appointment of

the board members would theoretically make the board responsible to the
governor.

Acquisition of the financial duties formerly performed by

the Board of Examiners, and preparation of the budget would presumably
place the Board of Administration in a powerful administrative position,
subject only to the control of the chief executive.General control
over state institutions and selection of the executive staff for these
institutions would complete the administrative power of the Board.
The Commission attempted to achieve these reforms ty legisla
tive enactment.

A bill was included in the Report outlining, in

detail, the powers of the contemplated Board.

Conflicting statutory

provisions for establishing such a board were eliminated in the draft
of this extensive bill.

The Commission, however, was ultimately forced

to recommend a constitutional amendment to establish the Board of Admin
istration.

It is evident from the report that after submitting the bill

for the creation of the Board, a question arose among legislators as
to the power of the legislative assembly to establish such a board by
mere statutory enactment.

Because the new Board was to acquire many of

the Board of Examiners' duties and powers, the legislature felt that it
could only be established by constitutional amendment.

The Commission

was not willing to scuttle its proposal however:
So strongly do we favor the creation of such a Board of Administra
tion and considerable controversy having arisen respecting the
power of the Legislature to create such a board— whose duties

l^ibid.. p. 49.
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would necessarily conflict with the duties imposed by the present
constitutional provision upon the Board of Examiners— that we
decided to recommend the submission of the accompanying amendment
• . . .I n view of the controversy alluded to, we soon decided that
the issue should be put squarely before the people whether such a
needed administrative agency should be authorized.
The amendment, as submitted to the people of the state, gave the Legis
lature power to establish a Board of Administration but the amendment
specifically stated that the general supervisory power of examining
claims would remain the province of the Board of Examiners.

The Board

of Administration would have the power to make purchases for the insti
tutions of the state but no mention of other control functions over
state institutions was made.

This amendment, however, was defeated in

the November election of 1920 by over 20,000 votes.
The general theme of the recommendations and accompanying argu
ments offered by the Commission was centralization of the administrative
affairs of the state.

Coordination of administrative and fiscal activi

ties would have undoubtedly been Improved under the proposed Board
of Administration but “authority— the power to direct” would continue
to be diffused.

The reluctance to do away with the elected offices

and their functions as administrative heads diluted the Board of Admin
istration plan for centralization of administration.

The responsibility

for the conduct of the administrative affairs of the state would con
tinue to be in the hands of the seven elected officials making up the
executive department of the state.

^'^Ibid,. pp. 161-162.
^%ontana. Secretary of State, Official Montana Election Returns.
1920. Montana State University Library.
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Collaterally, the Commission recommendations included only
statutory consolidation of a few of the many boards and bureaus con
stituting the administrative machinery of the state.

Due to the exis

tence of formidable constitutional sanction for the commission form of
administration in Monteuia, the Efficiency and Trade Commission was not
prepared to recommend extensive departmental consolidation.

According

to the Commission, the concept of functionally integrated departments
with single heads appointed by and responsible to the governor was a
sound approach to administration.

However the adoption of measures

for consolidation and departmentalization and the erection of a gover
nor's cabinet was considered too "spectacular."
The Commission did advocate in its plan the establishment of
an executive budget; the budget was to be the responsibility of the
proposed Baord of Administration.

Central accounting was recommended

by Tanner and Gilman, and incorporated into the Board of Administration
proposal.

Central purchasing was also recommended by the Commission.

These staff functions were placed in the hands of the proposed Board.
A merit system for testing, selecting, training, and retaining
qualified personnel in the state employ was neglected in the Commission's
recommendations.

The Commission seemed satisfied with the caliber and

efficiency of the state's personnel.

19

Generally, the Board of Administration would have relieved the
governor and the two other members of the Board of Examiners of many
routine activities.

The responsibility for the actions of the Board

^^Ibid.. p. 47.
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of Administration would fall to the governor because of his appointment
of the Board members.

Final authority of the Board’s fiscal activities,

however, would be ultimately in the hands of the three member Board of
Examiners.

Control and supervision by the Board of Administration over

state institutions was limited by the retention of the constitutional
provisions relating to several boards among which are the Board of
Examiners, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Board
of Bducation.^^
Recommendation of a three member board shows the insistence on
the concept of direction by a plural headed agency.

Due to the overlap

ping terms of the members of the proposed Board, the governor's control
over this body would have been reduced.

According to the Commission's

report, the members of the Board would not necessarily be professional
administrators; indeed, they recommended that two of the members be of
the same political party.

Such a stipulation in connection with the

idea of a plural headed administrative body is a continuation of the
checks and balances theory embodied in the concept of government by
commission so prevalent in the nineteenth century,
A single responsible executive to direct the entire adminis
trative apparatus of the state is central to the model plan.

The

Commission's initial departure from this concept was the proposal of
an administrative board.

Ultimate authority for fiscal management

remained with the Board of Examiners by virtue of the original constitu
tional provisions relating to that body. Control over the administrative

^Qjbid.. p. 103.
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agencies and bureaus could not be delegated to the Board of Administra
tion due to the constitutional position of the elected executive offi
cials and constitutional boards like the Board of Education.

Consoli

dation of agencies, though considered by the Commission to be theoreti
cally desirable, was given up as an impossible task due to constitutional
limitations. Also, the idea of citizen participation in administrative
boards was a factor contributing to the Commission's reluctance to advo
cate the elimination of plural headed agencies.

The Commission was not

prepared to advocate extensive amendment of the constitution to establish
the cabinet system adopted by Illinois two years earlier.

However, the

Commission was willing to submit the Board proposal to the people.

It

was convinced that the Board of Administration would be an improvement
over the existing administrative system, and at the same time would not
depart radically from the multi-headed executive tradition prevalent in
Montana.
The Commission's proposal for a Board of Administration was
entirely in keeping with their desire ". . .to recommend a conservative plan" for Montana governmental administration.

21

The plan was

perhaps not "conservative" enough for the Montana voter of that era
judging by its fate at the polls.

Some possible explanations for the

failure of the constitutional amendment will be offered in the last
chapter.

2^Ibld., p. 48.
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CHAPTER III
THE GRIFFENHAGEN STUDY
I"t was not until 1941 that Montana again approached the problem
of the state's governmental organization.

In that year, Governor Sam G.

Ford recommended to the Legislature that a thorough study of the state
administrative structure be made.

The Legislature responded to this

recommendation with little opposition and enacted Chapter 56 of the 1941
Session Laws giving the governor power to appoint an advisory committee
on Reorganization and Economy.^

Included in Chapter 56 was the express

provision for making an exhaustive study to gather information which
might lead to specific reconmendatlons relating to the improvement of
the state administration and to governmental

economies.

In addition,

the law gave the governor power to employ, with the advice of the advi
sory committee, a professional firm; "skilled in the science of govern
ment,

to undertake the actual investigation of the state's finances,

institutions, and general administrative facilities.
The Legislature appropriated $20,000 for the conduct of the study
and the governor, with the consent of the advisory committee, employed
Griffenhagen & Associates, a well known governmental consulting firm.

^The members of this committee were: W. E. Dowlin, Charles H.
Mahoney, Leonard Plank, Dry J. Armstrong, James N. Dougherty, Russell
E. Smith, Fred Bennion.
Montana, Committee on Reorganization and Economy, Reorganization
Report Submitted to the Twenty-Eighth Legislative Assembly by Governor
Sam C. Ford (Helena, January 1943), p. 1.
32
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This firm was selected on the basis of its experience in conducting
reorganizational studies, and as organizational consultants in other
state and local governments.^
Griffenhagen &

Associates began their investigations on July 1,

1941, and completed their voluminous report on March 1, 1942.

The study

conducted by the firm was thorough indeed; fifty-nine separate reports
were prepared on the various facets of Montana's government; there
were 1,415 typewritten pages in the cumulative report.

In all, a total

of 967 recommendations were made by the reorganization firm,^ Reccmmendations made by the firm ranged from minor references concerning
office procedures in the institutions, to major, and far-reaching pro
posals for state-wide administrative reform.

Some recommendations

merely required an executive order for their Implementation; others
would have required a great deal of legislation and even constitutional
amendment.
In making the study, Griffenhagen &

Associates would conduct

the investigation of a given agency or function and submit their
recommendations concerning that particular agency or function to the
governor.

The governor would then refer the recranmendations to the

advisory committee.

The advisory committee met with the official in

charge of the agency or function and allowed him to participate in the
discussion of the Griffenhagen report.

Upon completion of the

^Ibld., p. 5»
^Ibid.. p. 5.
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discussions, the advisory committee in conference with the governor
would discuss the report.

The recommendations were then approved,

amended or rejected by the committee.

When a recommendation’was approved

and where it did not require legislative action, the governor issued
an executive order to implement the recommendation.

Some recommenda

tions were sent to the legislature for consideration and action after
the war; most of these required legislation including additional appro
priations,

Recommendations requiring legislative action which were

approved by the committee were transmitted to the governor who, in turn,
submitted them to the legislature.

Other recommendations did not receive

approval by the committee and were not included in the report to the
legislature; they were, however, accessible to the legislators in the
state law library, along with the original and complete reports compiled
5
by Griffenhagen & Associates.
The studies conducted by the reorganization staff were divided
into three major divisions.

The first division included the department

or agency studies; activities, functions, and internal organization of
all the units of Montana government were included in this study division.
Operating policies, staff, expenditures, value and cost of the services
were also object of analysis.
A second division had to do primarily with financial and staff
surveys.

The accounting system, budget construction and control, expendi

ture and disbursements, debt administration, pre-audit, post-audit, and

5Ibid.. pp. 7-10.
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personnel policies and practices were considered in this division.
General state organization was the third division of study.

This

division (the most important for purposes of this study) was a broad
survey of the allocation of functions and general administrative rela
tionships existing in Montana's governmental organization.

It is within

the broad framework of this division that all the reorganization pro
posals advanced by the firm have their basis.
Griffenhagen & Associates believed that the administrative
structure of Montana needed to be reorganized.

They were convinced

that certain organizational principles were lacking in the executiveadministrative structure of the state.

In their general report several

sweeping reforms of Montana's administrative system were advocated.
The advocacy of these reorganizational proposals was predicated on six
general organizational principles:

simple and definite organization,

integration, logical allocation of functions, suitable managing authori
ties, continuity of operating policy, and competent personnel.^
In relation to the first principle— the need for simple and
definite organization— the firm explained that there was a need for a
clear and specific organizational plan.

There should not be numerous

agencies, branches and departments erected without reference to an over
all plan.

Each of the branches and agencies should be precisely defined

and the responsibility for the direction of the agency should be clearly
fixed.

The firm concluded that Montana's organization was not clear

and definitej it was complex, and responsibility for action was hard to

Montana, Griffenhagen & Associates, Report of the Governor's
nmmmittee on Economy and Efficiency. General State Organizational Report
No. 5S, pp. 10-13»
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determine.

Because responsibility was difficult to determine in the

various unconnected agencies, the study group found that the legislature
was in the habit of delegating authority for action upon many questions
to the Board of Examiners "under the guise of dealing with /their/
financial implications."
Montana, according to Griffenhagen & Associates, was definitely
in need of the second principle— integration.

Integration in the firm’s

vocabulary meant the coordination of the state’s activities under a
central executive authority.

Included in the concept of integration was

a provision for "facilities for promoting cooperative action among, and
g
providing common services to, the several departments."
The firm con
cluded. that the constitutional investment of the governor with "supreme
executive power" was not an actual fact in Montana.

The governor is

excluded from the use of his power because of provisions in the law:
giving independent authority to boards, commissions, and other
elective officers. Under such circumstances the governor is in
no position to 'see that the laws are faithfully executed. ’
Public opinion holds him responsible, but as he does not have the
authority necessary to enable him to carry out the responsibility
placed upon him by public opinion, as well as by the express
mandate of the constitution, he is placed in an Impossible posi
tion.^
Allocating functions on a logical basis was another principle
which the reorganization staff advocated.

Basically this principle

envisions the placing together of functions and activities which are
either similar in character, subject matter, or in the type of personnel

*^Ibid.« p. 10.
% i d .. p. 11.
^Ibid.. p. 11.
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performing the tasks.

The firm found that similar functions were dif

fused throughout the various agencies making up the administration of
Montana.

During their analysis the firm discovered several cases of

duplication and overlapping operations
According to the Griffenhagen staff, a single administrator is
the basic requirement involved in the principle of managing authorities.
The management of most activities should be in the hands of a single
directing officer.

Such an administrator should have the authority to

carry out his task and be provided with adequate counsel and staff aids.
The firm recognized the possible necessity for using boards as policy
agencies in certain circumstances but even in these cases they advocated
a single administrator to implement the decisions of the board.

Single

executives employed in directing positions, with authority and respon
sibility for the operation of governmental activities, was, according
to the firm, the exception and not the rule in Montana government.
Boards and commissions tended to predominate as the instruments for
administrative direction and supervision:
Entirely too many straight administrative and executive responsi
bilities are assigned to boards. Boards in general are not well
suited for executive action, and the least well adapted for this
type of responsibility are ex officio boards where the members
are engrossed in other dutie^^ Yet many such boards have been
given administrative duties.
This form of administration, of course, had its roots in the constitu
tional framework of Montana.
Another principle advanced by Griffenhagen & Associates involved

lOlbld.. p. 12.
^^Ibid.. p. 12.
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the idea of a continuing operating policy.

Continuity of policy in the

management of state affairs is primarily enforced through employment
practices.

Montana, the firm concluded, had a history of interest in

continuity; continuity was provided, however, by the appointment of
people to boards and commissions for overlapping terms.

A principle

advocated by the group having a collateral relationship with the prin
ciple of continuity was the principle of recruiting and retaining com
petent personnel.

While finding no evidence of ", . . widespread

incompetency among the state's employees. ,

the firm concluded that

there was no systematic approach to the problems of selecting qualified
personnel and retaining competent employees.

12

When the firm's principles were applied to Montana the evidence
of divergency was abundant.

The executive-administrative branch of

Montana government was found by Griffenhagen & Associates to violate
nearly all the principles.
The organization is such as to defy accurate charting that would
truthfully show the relationships among the various agencies.
A basic reason for the diffused character of the state's administrative
system was the Legislature's attempt to control administrative activi
ties.

In connection with the "supreme executive power" allocated to the

governor by the constitution, the firm pointed out:
. . . the existing organization is so designed as to go far in
nullifying rather than implementing this section of the consti
tution. This situation results from various devices that have
been used deliberately, in establishing agencies to carry on

l^Ibld.. p. 6.
^^Ibid.. p. 6,
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administrative functions, to^eaken the governor’s influence over
the agencies involved. . .
Primarily the devices used to weaken the governor’s control were the
establishment of boards for directing administration.

Correspondingly,

there was a restriction of the governor's power to appoint responsible
single heads to direct the activities of the several governmental units,
The governor has complete authority for the appointment of members to
these boards in only about half the agencies over which these boards
preside.

However, according to the reorganization staff, this power

does not insure control over the operation of a given agency:
This does not mean that he /the governoj^ can always exercise
control because many of the boards are made up of members whose
terms are longer than that of the governor, with only a fraction
of the membership up for appointment at any one time,^
Another abridgement of the principles outlined by the firm regarded
the composition of membership upon these boards.
According to the provisions establishing many of the boards in
Montana, membership upon the boards must be drawn from the areas of the
economy or society served by the boards.

The governor in many cases

must appoint people engaged as private citizens in the activity con
trolled by the board.

Griffenhagen & Associates considered this incon

sistent with good government:
Such provisions overlook the principle that if the state govern
ment is to conform to the high ideals upon which the state consti
tution is predicated, the purpose of government regulation and
government activity in general must be the protection and improve
ment of the welfare of the citizenry as a whole.

^Ibid.. p. 7.
^^Ibid«. p. 8.
^^Ibid.. p. 26.
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The staff found that there were at least fifteen boards where one or
more members were selected in this fashion.

17

Another type of administrative device with which the firm took
exception was the ex officio board.

Montana, in keeping with the idea

of internal checks and balances in the executive branch, has made exten
sive use of this type board for administrative purposes.

The popularly

elected members of Montana's executive department are required to sit on
these boards to supervise the operation of certain state activities.
The purpose of this kind of administrative or executive unit is to elimi
nate the possibility of total authority accruing to one individual.
These ex officio duties are an addition to the duties imposed upon the
officers in connection with the respective constitutional offices for
which they were elected.

Regarding the ex officio activities of these

elected officers, the reorganization staff concluded that these offi
cials s
, , , are selected for particular jobs. Under any sound plan of
organization they should be fully occupied with such jobs. The
diversion of their time and energies to other frequently unrelated
matters can only result in that much neglect of the basic respon
sibilities of their cæiginal positions. The duties now assigned
to ex officio boards should be assigned directly to the agency
with which their activities gge associated most closely, and the
boards should be eliminated.
As pointed out above, ex officio boards were inconsistent with the firm's
idea of good administration^ boards are inferior to single administra
tors and ex officio boards are least effective for purposes of directing
19
activities.

^^ibid,. p, 7.
l^ibld,. p. 21,
^%upra. p. 6.
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The Reorganization Plans
To implement reform in Montana government along the lines sug
gested by these principles would have involved extensive constitutional
amendment.

The analysis of Montana’s administrative *system indicated

the need for extensive reform according to the firm.

However, the

practical obstacles to a sweeping reorganization were apparent to the
firm’s staff.

Therefore, Griffenhagen & Associates prepared two plans

based upon their analysis of Montana's organization.

The first pimn

was called a ’’proposed” or "long range” plan, and the second a "modi
fied” or "immediate” plan.
The "long range” plan was based almost entirely on the principles
of state administration enumerated by the firm.

The structure of this

long range plan was simple and precise; responsibility was fixed and
authority centered.

The governor would be the single elected executive

officer and would preside over seventeen departments making up the admin
istrative service.

The direction of each department would be the task

of a single administrator appointed by, and responsible to, the gover
nor.^®
A governor’s or “executive cabinet" would be instituted and the
directing officers of the departments would comprise the membership of
this cabinet.

Because certain activities of government are of a quasi

legislative or quasi-judicial nature, the firm agreed that some of the
departments should have a board to deliberate appeals from persons
affected by certain of these activities.

Six such boards were included

^®General State Organization Report No, 58, p. 23.
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in the long range plan.

Agencies would be structured in the depart

ments on a functional basis.

The primary function of the plan would be

to place the governor in the position of chief executive as formally
expressed in the constitution.^^
The first plan was not presented with any hope of adoption.

An

awareness of the constitutional and political impediments to such a
plan prevented the firm from submitting it as the only proposal for
reform of Montana’s governmental system.
The first plan /the long range plaj^ . . . would be desirable to
adopt if it were possible to ignore all the constitutional and
other difficulties in the way. It is intended for use only as a
guide for future legislation and for constitutional amendments
needed to clear the way, step by step, for its ultimate adoption.
There are too many obstacles to permit its immediate adoption.
The long range plan was not adopted ty the advisory committee in
any case.
for action.

It was transmitted to the Legislature without recommendation
In the final report to the Legislature, the plan occupies

only one page in the 132 page report.

23

Generally, the long range plan is in conformity with the model
plan contained in Chapter One,^^ Based upon the principles formulated
Ty the Griffenhagen firm, the first plan embodies the idea of responsi
bility commensurate with authority.

The vertical arrangement of the

organization would insure clear lines of authority from the bottom to
the top and from top to the bottom of the administrative structure.

^^Ibid.. p. 30.

22ibid.
^^noTTiTTiittee Report, pp. 118-119.
24supra. Chapter One, p. 15.
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the top of the structure, the governor, as the only elected executive
official, would become the real chief executive.

Appointment and removal

power over the department heads would place the authority and responsi
bility for administrative policy and action (or inaction) in the gover
nor's hands.
Departments, in the long range plan, were to be comprised of
agencies placed in these departments on a unifunctional basis.

The

number of administrative units, according to the plan, would be sub
stantially reduced as a result of integration into departments.

As

mentioned above, the board or commission concept of administration would
have been effectively eliminated by the institution of single adminis
trators to head departments and agencies.

Boards would be retained in

advisory capacities with the final decision for action resting with a
single administrative officer.

Quasi-judicial functions and quasi

legislative activities would be assigned to boards but the administra
tion of board decisions would be carried out through a single adminis
trator.
To insure an adequate staff for the chief executive the long
range plan incorporated a governor's cabinet comprised of the appointed
department heads.

This provision corresponds to the model.

Other staff

aids including a provision for a personnel agency were advocated by the
firm.

This, also, is in keeping with the model.

Central budgeting,

another staff function, was included in the plan as was a provision
for a central accounting organization.

Furnishings and ceptral purchas

ing were to be included in the executive branch under administrators
responsible to the governor.
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A post-audit of the state's expenditures by a legislative postauditor was also advocated in the plan and conforms specifically to the
model.

Perhaps the only provision not included in the long range pign

which does appear in the model is a provision for a planning agency as
part of the governor's staff contingent.
As conceived, the long range plan would have implemented the
principles expressed by Griffenhagen & Associates and would, with minor
exceptions, conform closely to the model.

Indeed, the administrative

principles advanced by Griffenhagen are in direct conformity with the
model.

Some differences as to number of departments or in names «wd

place of an integrated agency within the structure might occur among
advocates of this model concept, but, generally, the firm's principles
and the principles embodied in the model are not divergent.

The Modified Plan
Because the long range plan was considered Impractical a second
plan was introduced.

The second or modified plan presented by the

Griffenhagen people was an attempt to improve the administration of
Montana within the framework of the constitution.

As much of the basic

plan as could be enacted by statute was retained in the modified plan.
The elected members of the executive department and the powerful Board
of Examiners were continued in this plan.

The modified plan included

twenty departments, seven appointed boards and seven ex officio boards.
While the modified plan retained all the constitutional boards, offices,
mnH agencies, it did reduce the total number of administrative units in

^^Renne, p. 116.
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the state administration from 136 to 53.

This lower figure was

achieved primarily by consolidating several functions, similar in nature,
into single departments.
The modified plan retained the executive cabinet proposal found
in the long range plan.

In some cases the constitutional provisions

for boards necessitated the utilization of these boards as the directing
authority for a department instead of the more acceptable single head.
Where a board presided over the department, the executive officer of
the board would be a member of the cabinet.

The purpose of the cabinet

would be to acquaint the various department heads with the over-all
functions of the state primarily with regard to fiscal matters

The

erection of a cabinet and the use of integrated departments with some
single heads appointed by the governor was intended to place the governor
in a position of greater control over the executive branch.

Within

Montana's constitutional limitations this plan attempted to give the
governor authority more nearly commensurate with his responsibility.
Montana's elected executive officials were utilized for adminis
trative purposes in the modified plan.

A

department of law was created,

the functions of which would be the same as those performed by the
attorney general's office.

According to the Griffenhagen firm, several

state agencies were hiring their own legal counsel.

The new department

of law would handle all the legal work for every part of the state
government and the practice of hiring additional legal staff by agencies

^%eport No. 5Ô, p. 8.
27jbld., p. 36.
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would be abolished.

In the long run the firm advocated the abolition

of the attorney general as an elected office.

This was in keeping with

the principles embodied in the long range plan.
Another elected officer, the state auditor, was placed in the
modified plan as a post-auditor.

The auditor is, according to the con

stitution, a member of the executive department,

Griffenhagen & Associ

ates stated that the office properly belonged in the legislative branch,
performing the function of an independent post-audit of the state's
expenditures.

However, due to the constitutional provisions placing

the auditor in the executive branch, the firm retained the position but
altered the function.

The purpose of the auditor in the modified plan

was to conduct a post-audit of the state and submit it to a proposed
legislative audit committee.

These duties would require the absorption

by the auditor of functions previously handled by the state accountant
and the state examiner.

In addition, the auditor would, under the plan,

be relieved of all ex officio duties and membership on all ex officio
boards where possible without constitutional amendment,
A department of state, headed by the secretary of state, was
recommended in the modified plan.

The duties of this department were

primarily the same as those usually performed by the secretary of state's
office.

These functions are related to the keeping of the state records,

preparing voting tabulations and other matters relating to elections.
In the view of the reorganization staff, the office was of such a nature
that the policy of selecting the secretary of state by election was
without merit.
Aside from the duties imposed upon the boards of which he is a
member, the duties of the secretary of state are largely of a
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ministerial character. They involve little discretionary power
and almost no responsibility for important matters of state policy.
Election is an expensive and inefficient method of selection of
administrative officers . . . it is recommended that the constitu
tion be amended to provide for filling the office by appointment
of the governor.
Included in the departmental concept of the modified plan was a
department of the treasury headed by Montana's elected treasurer.

Pri

marily, the duties of the department were a continuation of the former
duties performed by the office of the treasurer with the addition of
some responsibilities in the area of investments.

This additional

function was designed to center the investment activity in one state
office rather than continue the dispersal of various investment pro
cedures among several agencies.

In addition, the constitutional Board

of Examiners would reside in the proposed department of the treasury
and would constitute a board of finance.

However, the reorganization

staff advocated the abolition of the Board of Examiners as soon as possi
ble.

The firm also recommended the elimination of the elective office

of treasurer, ultimately transferring the department of treasury functions to a department of revenue under the control of the governor.

29

Another fiscal department, a department of finance, would deal
with the general management of Montana's finances including:

budget

preparation, pre-audit personnel administration, purchasing, and account
ing.

Agencies which had formerly performed these functions would be

transferred and integrated in the finance department.

The department

would be headed by a single administrator appointed by the governor,

28%bid.. p. 39.
^^Ibid.. p. 43.
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however, constitutional authority for the performance of all these
functions had to be provided for by including the Board of Examiners in
the department.

Here, also, the firm continued to urge the eventual

abolition of the Board of Examiners,
The modified plan as outlined in the final report was an attempt
to consolidate the many administrative functions of the state into a
logical pattern of departments within the constitutional framework.
This was to be affected by integrating agencies into departments under
single heads where possible and by creating an executive cabinet.

The

cabinet was an attempt to provide greater authority and control by the
governor over the state’s administrative system.

However, the retention

of constitutional boards and elected officers of the executive branch
departed from the idea of concentrated authority and responsibility.
The modified plan was the offspring of expediency and reflected the for
midable constitutional and political obstacles to any reform of Montana
government.

Discussing the problems of reorganization, Griffenhagen &

Associates observed:
Necessarily, any change can be expected to meet with some opposi
tion because there are always those who are so reluctant to give up
anything to which they are accustomed for anything unfamiliar to
their experience that they will simply not go into the merits of
what is proposed. This type of ’blind’ opposition often can be
met only by a stronger force,
The modified plan also departs from the model described here in
Chapter One,

Retention of the elected administrative officers; dispersal

of authority for administrative action among several boards and

30lbid,. pp. 43-46.
31lbid.. p. 14.
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commissionsj and fiscal control by the three members of the elected
executive are all examples of the departure of the modified plan from
the model.
Departmentalization based upon functional integration is in keep
ing with the model, but in the modified plan authority for directing is
placed in the hands of a board or commission; thus, the principle of
single heads with authority and responsibility for action is absent.
In the case of those proposed departments where an elected officer is
the head, responsibility to the governor is absent.

Coordination of

policy would rest upon the willingness of these independent elected
officials to follow policy recommendations made by the governor.
Fiscal control in the modified plan is vested (as in the consti
tution) in the independent, elected officers comprising the Board of
Examiners.

Post-audit of the expenditures of the government would be

conducted by the state auditor.

But the auditor, being an elected

official, would not necessarily be responsible to the Legislature.

In

addition, authority for the conduct of a post-audit would not be entirely
in the hands of the auditor unless a constitutional amendment was passed,
allowing the auditor to exercise some of the accounting duties consti32
tutionally allocated to the state examiner and the state accountant."^
The proposed staff aids in the modified plan are similar to those
in the model.

A budget division in the department of finance and a

division of personnel administration conform in principle to the model.
However, because the Board of Examiners is the executive head of the

^^Ibld.. p. 35.
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proposed finance department, authority and responsibility for the fiscal
operations of the state would be subject to possible compromise among
the members of this multi-headed executive body.

Retention of the Board

of Examiners is definitely inconsistent with the model plan; authority
and subsequent direction would rest on a collective decision.
responsibility would also be imposed.

Collective

The Griffenhagen staff was well

aware of this situation when they wrote:
It has been clearly demonstrated and is generally conceded that
administrative functions cannot in the average case be exercised
with continuing effectiveness by boards. Action on countless
details, involving innumerable personal contacts and immediate
decisions, rather than group Judgment, is called for in the exercise
of such functions. Doubts as to authority to act, unwillingness
to assume responsibility, the need for consultation, explanation,
and compromise— all these— slow up action. . .
Such a situation, coupled often with a diverse political complexion,
makes the Board of Examiners, as an instrument of administering staff
and fiscal functions, particularly divergent from the model.
The long range plan, as mentioned, was not recommended to the
Legislature for adoption.

Included in the modified plan were several

recommendations extracted from the long range plan, but these recommenda
tions were offered as goals for future amendment and legislation.

A

long and detailed bill was drafted encompassing the recommendations
offered in the modified plan.

The bill, however, was defeated in tlB

Legislature in 19A3«
Generally, the principles enunciated by the Griffenhagen people
correspond to current administrative theory.

Movements within other

states have resulted in the adoption of similar proposals.

Several

^^Ibid.. p. 18.
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factors contributed to the failure in Montana of even the modified
version of the Griffenhagen plan.

The study conducted by the firm was

too detailed; the fundamental problems and the proposed solutions to
these problems were obscured by the firm's emphasis on minutiae.

Per

haps the temporal aspect of the study also contributed to its failure.
Proposals to expand the authority of the executive branch, offered
during a time when the world was engaged in an armed conflict over
totalitarianism, were not destined for a rational discussion.

Political

factors were responsible in large part for the failure of the proposals;
they will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
The evidence of diffused authority and responsibility found by
the firm was abundant.

The reasons for this diffusion were clearly and

accurately described by the firm.

Most of these problems remain extant

in Montana today, though subsequent efforts on a more limited scale have
been made to rectify them.

It is to one of these more recent efforts

that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 17
THE COMMISSION ON REORGANIZATION

In 1951, another commission of major importance, the Commission
on Reorganization of State Government of the State of Montana, was
created to survey the entire structure of state organization.

The

members of the Commission were all legislators (differing in this
respect from the advisory committee in the 19-41 study).^

Not only

was the composition of the Commission legislative in character, but the
responsibility of the Commission was to the Legislature and not the

2
governor.

The political complexion of the group was bi-partisan with

an equal number of members from each political party on the Commission.
Supplementary task force committees composed of citizens outside the
Legislature, and members of the Commission, did most of the actual
3
survey work.
The Commission was charged with the task of making a complete
study of the organization and structure of Montana government.

The

Commission was authorized:
. . . to review and analyze the various activities, functions,
departments and boards of the state government and reccmmend the

1

The members of this Commission were: Glenn H, Larson, chairman,
E. F. McQuitty, vice chairman, Donovan Worden, H. A. Tibbals, Winfield
£. Page, John J. MacDonald, William R. Mackay, and Melvin E. Magnuson,
secretary.
^Montana, The Commission on Reorganization of State Government
of the State of Montana Report to the Thirty-Third Legislative Assembly
(January, 1953), p. iv.
!
^Ibid.. p. iv.
52
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consolidation, reorganization or abolishment of those not deemed
essential to the welfare of the people of the state.^
Armed with this rather broad grant, the Commission began its work.
One of the initial acts of the Commission was to employ an execu
tive director to head and coordinate the work of the Commission and task
force committees.

The Montana Taxpayer's Association offered the ser

vices of a member of its staff, Frederick Gillette, as executive dir
ector.

Mr, Gillette's

salary was to be paid half by the Taxpayer's

Association, and half from Commission funds; this arrangement was
accepted and Gillette was retained.^
Of primary concern to the Committee was the organization of the
executive-administrative branch of Montana.

In the meetings of the

Commission several of the problems inherent in the general structure
of the state's administration were discussed.

The governor, the various

agencies, their growth in number and complexity, and the important
State Board of Examiners were objects of extensive deliberation.

The

Commission had no particular plan or set of principles to guide it in
its study of the executive organization.

Because no broad principles

were formulated, the Commission relied on the feelings expressed by
the membership and upon testimony of citizens and officials interested
in the organization of the executive-administrative branch.

^Ibid.. p. iv.
^Note: This unusual salary arrangement was prompted by expedi
ency. The Montana Taxpayer's Association was interested in the Com
mission's work, particularly any aspect of it that would result in
economies in government. It was due to this interest that the Associa
tion offered the services of Gillette. The Commission accepted this
offer primarily on economic grounds. Conversation with Winfield 2.
Page, September 3, I960, Missoula, Montana.
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Generally, the question with which the Commission was dealing
had to do with the location of authority and responsibility for the
administration of state activities.

This question ultimately led to a

discussion of the merits of investing the governor with sole responsi
bility and authority by consolidating operating and control agencies
into departments headed by administrators appointed by, and responsible
to, the governor.

An alternate question logically followed regarding

the merits of retaining the existing allocation of authority and respon
sibility among the elected officials, the Board of Examiners, and other
constitutional bodies.

Testimony was taken from several people regard

ing the organization of the executive branch.

An invitation was sent

to the members of the former advisory committee participating in the
Griffenhagen study in 1943 to gain their assistance and advice on this
matter.

For various reasons these people were unable to attend.^
Many conflicting opinions were expressed by the members of the

Commission and by witnesses; some supported, in varying degrees,
retention of the constitutional form of organization; others ^recommended
a departure from the constitutional form.

After hearing this testimony

the Commission adopted an amended motion stating;
. . . That the Commission go on record as proposing to study the
executive branch of state government with the view to reorganizing
it along functional lines, using constitutional offices so far as
possible.'

Montana, The Commission on Reorganization of State Government
of the State of Montana, Minutes. November 15. 1951» Collected Papers,
Montana State and Territory (Montana State University Library), Micro
film.

’jbiâ-
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Mopting this approach, the Commission began considering proposals in
a more restricted frame of reference.
One of the bodies of primary concern in the state »s organizational
fabric was the powerful Board of Examiners.

Because the Board was com

posed of the governor and two other popularly elected members of the
executive branch, some question of precise designation of authority and
responsibility among the members was raised.

A

letter was received by

the C(«mission from the clerk of the Board of Examiners, Mr. Fitzsimmons,
He proposed a board of control appointed by the governor to replace the
Board of Examiners.

In an interview with Mr. Fitzsimmons, the Commission

was given a general review of the work of the Board.

Mr. Fitzsimmons

pointed out that not all the Boards of Examiners in his experience
(nearly thirty years) had been in harmony.

Mr. Fitzsimmons suggested

that his proposed board of control have responsibility not only for claim
approval but be in charge of the custodial institutions as well.

Some

(Question as to the feasibility of such a radical change was voiced in
the interview:
Mr. Larson asked if Mr. Fitzsimmons really believed that a con
stitutional amendment abolishing the Board of Examiners, as pre
sently constituted, stood much chance of passage. Mr. Fitzsimmons
said he didn't know the answer to that. He said it was amazing how
few people in Montana knew what the State Board of Examiners was.
He said people, when he tells them he works for the State Board
of Examiners,-will ask him if he doesn't mean the State Board of
Equalization.
Mr. Fitzsimmons indicated that in his opinion such an amendment, if made
"bj the Commission, stood a stronger chance of passage than at any other

Minutes. January 16, 1952.
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time.

9
Â member of the Commission who supported, in part, the proposal

to abolish the Board of Examiners said that he felt there would be little
opposition from the elected members of the Board.

His reasoning was

that abolition of the Board would allow them more time to conduct the
affairs of their respective elected offices.

In this, Mr. Fitzsimmons

did not entirely concur:
Mr. Fitzsimmons said while that was true in part, it still should
be remembered that there is a matter of prestige and power involved,
and that no official within his experience has ever been happy to
relinquish his prestige and power.^
The proposals to abolish the Board of Examiners and to make the governor
the chief executive in fact, evidently gained some support in the Com
mission.

In June of 1952, consideration was still being given by the

Commission to the proposal though they had previously agreed to the idea
of retaining the constitutional structure as far as possible.
In a conference with Governor John Bonner the Commission outlined
a proposal for the elimination of the Board of Examiners.
this discussion centered on three main points.

Generally,

The first of these

related to the abolishment of the Board of Examiners and placing its
authority in the governor.

A second point involved the appointment of

a board responsible to the governor to handle the administrative tasks
formerly carried on by the Board of Examiners.

^Notes This statement was perhaps made
legislative composition of the Commission. It
composed entirely of legislators would receive
hand* of legislature than one appointed by the

The third point involved

regarding the strictly
was felt that a group
better treatment at the
governor.

^°Ibid.
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the erection of staff facilities for the governor.

Governor Bonner's

reaction to these proposals was;
• . . that he concurred in them fully. He said under the present
arrangement with the splitting of responsibility / f o ^ the state's
affairs between the chief executive and the attorney general, and
the secretary of state, it was a wonder that the state government
held together as well as it did,^^
In subsequent meetings of the Commission support was voiced for this plan
but division among the members as to the theory of executive power became
increasingly evident.^

Opinions from former state officials indicated

that transfer of the powers of the Board of Examiners to the governor
would not be in the interests of the state:
Mr. Gillette then reported to the Commission the views of Governor
Ford and Associate Justice Bottomly, who were governor and attorney
general respectively during most of the 1940's. Their view was
that the judgment of three men on matters of important state policy
is better than the judgment of one man. Neither of them would
favor the elimination of the Board of Examiners.^^
The feeling among the members toward the theory of executive power
began to solidify around retention of the constitutional form.

Some of

the duties which had accrued to the Board of Examiners were considered
to be primarily the responsibility of the governor.

However, a sweep

ing proposal for the transfer of the duties was not acceptable even to
those Commission members who felt the Board of Examiners organization
inconsistent with good administration.
Mr, McQuitty said he had long ago come to the opinion that the
people of the state in voting for an attorney general and a secretary

^^Minutes, June 19» 1952.
^Minutes. August 28, 1952 and Minutes. October 14, 1952.
^^Minutes. October 17, 1952.
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of state do not vote for those officers on the basis that such
officers are going to be the state's top executives, but they
voted for them on the basis of qualifications for the job of
attorney general, and the job of Mcretary of state. He said
a change would be a far-reacting /sic/ thing, and that he did not
believe as a result of the work of this Commission, that'we were
in a position to go to the Legislature and propose it because we
did not have a sufficiently well-developed plan to serve as an
alternative.
Contained within the Commission's final report to the Legislature
were a few recommendations transferring from the Board of Examiners to
the governor minor statutory powers concerning automobile usage and
allocation of money between budget classifications within departments.
Some very significant legislation was drafted proposing the
transfer of extensive power from the Board of Examiners to the governor
in the areas of contract awarding, printing, and supply purchase:
Generally, the State Board of Examiners have had the general super
vision, direction and control of the subject matter of . . . con
tracts for supplies, printing, furnishing of the legislative
assembly with furniture and letting of contracts for public build
ings and improvements. The proposed legislation will transfer
these contracting powers to the governor with the controller as
his administrative agent for the purpose of performing a U of the
acts required and fully advising the governor of the need, the
costs and aiqr other particulars with regard^to the accepting of
bids and letting of contracts for the same.
However, this "proposed" legislation was not included in the Commission
report and was never introduced on the floor of the Legislature.
members of the Commission changed their minds and it was dropped.

The
The

reason for this collective change of mind lies in the expressed reluc
tance of the new governor, Hugo Aronson, to see the introduction of

14ibid.
^^Letter from Frederick Gillette, executive director of the
Commission, to Fred Martin, executive secretary of the governor, Helena,
Montana, January 23, 1953.
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such legislation.

This reluctance was born of the governor's fear that

a proposed transfer of these powers from the Board of Examiners would
alienate the other two members of the board— the attorney general and
secretary of state— and cause friction in his future associations with
them on the board.
In the final report to the legislative assembly the Commission
expressed its belief that the governor should have authority commensurate
with his constitutional responsibility.

They felt that in Montana the

power to direct the state administration had been diffused in several
ways*
. . . (1) failure to give the governor general powers of direction
and supervision over state administration. (2) Corollary to this
has been the granting of powers to a multi-headed executive— the
State Board of Examiners. The governor bears public responsibility
for the administration of legislative policies in the eyes of the
j^blic and yet he has not been given the authority, . , . The other
two members of the State Board of Examiners— the attorney general
and secretary of state— have little if ai^r responsibility in the
public mind for administration of state affairs, but nonetheless
possess the management authority, . .
However, as pointed out above, the recommended transfer of power from
the Board of Examiners to the governor was not introduced in the legis
lative assembly.

Therefore, the Goimnission's analysis of misallocation

of authority and responsibility was not supplemented by the introduction
of corrective legislation.

The Commission also felt that the growth

of state agencies and the character of boards and commissions contributed
to a lack of executive supervision.

13

^^Interview with Winfield Page, former member of the Commission,
Missoula, Montana, August 2, I960.
^'^Report. p. 2.
IBlbid.. p. 3.
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Commission proposals for reform of the several administrative
agencies in Montana were based on two major conclusions.

In the first

place, the Commission felt that there were a number of boards which
were no longer of any value to the state, or that the functions of a
number of boards could be transferred to other agencies.

The Commission

recommended the abolishment of thirteen boards and transfer of any
remaining active functions to some other

a

g

e

n

c

y

.

second conclu

sion was related to the board or commission structure of many agencies
in Montana,

Many members felt that the commission form of government

was acceptable:
In general, however, the commission tradition is very strong in
Montana government. This strength grows from the sound ground of
citizen interest, and citizen willingness to participate in state
government. Some commission members bring years of experience and
judgment to their tasks, qualities which no single administrator,
however qualified or zealous, could match,
However, the Commission reasoned that in order to identify responsibility
for board decisions, and to give the governor some control over these
boards, the appointment of board members should be for the same period
as the governor’s term of office.

Overlapping terms, they felt, made

the governor an heir to the previous administration’s appointees.

There

fore, the Commission advocated four year terms for members of boards
qrif^ that composition of boards should be of a bi—partisan character with
a preponderance of the board membership being from the party of the
g o v e r n o r , T h i s affected a compromise; on the one hand, the commission

^^Ibid., p. 9.
^^Ibid,. p. 5*
21ibid,, pp« 5—6.
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tradition could be preserved, and at the same time the governor's con
trol would be assured.

Apparently the Commission favored the retention

of a board member selection process in which the governor was required
to select members from the economic category served by the board.
In a meeting with Dr. John Sly, Chairman of the Department of
State and Local Government at Princeton University, the problem created
ty the existence of a large number of licensing and examining boards
was discussed:
Dr. Sly said, 'don’t try to consolidate them and wipe them off the
organizational chart.' % said, 'you will have every dentist,
every doctor, every accountant, every plumber, every Tseautician,
every barber, and every food distributor landing right square on
the legislature's neck if you start that.'^^
This counsel evidently prevailed because the Commission's only recommend
ation regarding this subject of examining boards was that some future
council or legislative committee "undertake a thorough study of the
various licensing and examining boards.
The Commission was aware of the lack of coordination among the
large number of agencies in Montana government and sought a plan which
would minimize this c o n d i t i o n , T o improve coordination and restrict
the possible occurrence of overlapping and duplication, the Commission
proposed three inter-departmental advisory councils.

These councils

were to function in the areas of health and welfare, natural resource
development, and agriculture and livestock.

Erection of them was aimed

^%inutes. April lA, 1952.
^^Report. p. 9.
^^Ibid.. p. 5.
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at providing the inatitutional equipment for a "teamwork approach" to
problems common in all three a r e a s . S u c h a plan was a
institution below the level of the chief executive.

of cabinet

In the subsequent

legislative session, legislation was passed erecting these councils.
Possible staff assistance for the governor was also considered
by the Commission.

From their studies, the Commission concluded that

there was an urgent need for a personnel system in the state. A merit
system was in operation in Montana, but this system covered only state
employees working in agencies in which both federal and state funds
were being expended.

The federal government required these agencies to

adopt a merit program, but the major portion of state employees were
under no personnel system.

The Commission recommended the creation of

an agency to administer personnel, set up position classifications, and
establish pay scales.

The proposed agency was to have a commission of

four members appointed by the governor for four year terms and an
executive director appointed by the commission was to direct the activi
ties of the agency.

/

This recommendation was subsequently enacted into

There was a great deal of discussion over the important staff

function of budget preparation.

In 1951, a law was passed removing the

^^Ibid.. p. 7.
2%otes The personnel commission operated between 1953 and 1955 <
However, opposition in the Legislature to the commission’s choice of
commission director and opposition by state officials to the personnel
plan submitted by the commission resulted in its destruction. The 1955
Legislature refused to appropriate funds for the commission's continu
ance; the law creating the commission remains on the statute books but
the commission is, at present, inoperative.
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power to prepare a budget from the Board of Examiners and placing the
responsibility with the state controller, an appointee of the governor*
However, the controller is not necessarily responsible to the governor
as his term of appointment is for eight years.

Thus, it was possible

for a new governor to inherit the previous administration's budget
director.

The Commission discussed the desirability of transferring

responsibility for budget preparation to the chief executive since the
overlapping term of the controller might effectively eliminate the gover
nor's control over the budget. ' In the meeting with Dr. Sly, this situa
tion was deliberated:
It was pointed out that the power of the budget making has, through
enactment of the Comptroller Law /sic/, been removed from the hands
of the executive and placed in the hands of an official who is
strictly neither legislative or executive. Dr. Sly's comment was
that it is better to adhere to the constitutional divisions of
power, as between the executive and legislative and Judicial. He
said that departures from long established forms are certain to
lead to eventual trouble. He said in long run, the state will be
better off with an executive budget prepared by the governor. . . .
Dr. Sly said that it is a mistake to let subordinate officers
determine fiscal policy • . * officers, such as the comptroller
/sic^ who are outside the traditional framework of government, do
not have the responsibility to the people upon which the determina
tion of fiscal policy must rest.^^
However, the proposals of the Commission relating to the budget in the
final report did not transfer the budget functions to the governor but
rather added new functions to the controller in his continuing role as
the chief officer in budget matters.

^'^Minutes. April L4, 1952.
^%enort. pp. 24.-27. Note: The controller law was repealed in
1959, and responsibility for budget preparation was transferred to the
governor.
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The Analysis
Generally, the Commission on Reorganization indicated in its
final report that the governor's office was entirely too weak.

In the

early meetings of the Commission there was evidence of a genuine desire
to strengthen the office, never, however, to the point of eliminating
aiQT of the elected executive officials.

The subsequent recommendations

indicated a change in the Commission's thinking.
The possible elimination of the Board of Examiners was never
strongly considered, and the proposal to transfer some of the Board's
important powers over purchasing and contract functions was not intro
duced into the Legislature for consideration.

Thus, the Commission,

though considering various proposals for making the governor's authority
commensurate'with his responsibility, made no concerted legislative
effort in that direction.

The authority for directing the adminis

trative apparatus continued to be diffused among the members of the
elected executive department.

The Commission recommendations did little

to discourage or ameliorate this situation and thus are not in conform
ity with the model plan mentioned in Chapter One.
Another and similar departure from the model plan also resulted
from the Commission's decision to retain the constitutional framework
of the state.

Consolidation of administrative agencies into single

headed departments responsible to the governor was not advocated by the
Commission.

Some integration of the functions of dormant boards into

existing agencies was recommended, but no extensive departmental con
solidation resulted.

In order to achieve some semblance of control by

the governor over these departments the Commission advocated that the
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boards governing them be comprised of members, the majority of whom were
from the governor's party.

In addition, all board members were to serve

only during the governor's incumbency.

Single headed departments were

not considered feasible or desirable by the Commission; adherence to the
board and commission concept of government prevailed in the recommenda
tions made by the Commission— this is also a direct departure from the
model.
The Commission attempted to overcome problems of agency and
department coordination by proposing interdepartmental advisory councils.
These councils were subsequently established by the Legislature but are
considerably short of the governor's cabinet proposed for this purpose
in the model.

In fact, the governor was excluded from participation

on these inter-departmental councils because it was feared he would
dominate them.^9

Thus, the professed (.asire for greater authority for

the governor was circumscribed.

Extensive proposals for consolidation

were considered politically unpalatable; one of the task forces engaged
in studying the possibility of consolidations reported:
. . . that any change such as that embodied in the Griffenhagen
Report No. 58 would meet and involve considerable opposition . .
Tgtpand-fng the personal staff of the governor was at one time
proposed by the Comnission.

Governor Bonner endorsed this proposal.

However, no legislation on the subject was introduced.
The budget function was retained under the controller; indeed,
additional duties of a budgetary nature were assigned to the controller

^^Minutes. August 28, 1952.
^^Inutes. June 8, 1951-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
and effective supervision by the governor was not implemented.

This is

a substantial departure from the model which advocates that the governor
have the authority and responsibility for preparing a budget.
Accounting also came in for consideration.
tutional provisions prevented a complete central

As existing consti
accounting system,

the Commission recommended that, where possible, the accounting system
should be centralized under the controller.

Included in the Commission's

conception of a central accounting system was a provision that the post
audit function also be carried out by the controller.

This officer,

because of his eight year appointment, was not necessarily responsible
to the governor who served only a four year term.

It could not be said

that the controller was responsible to the Legislature because of his
appointment by the governor.

As pointed out by Dr. Sly, the controller's

office was independent of either branch.

Therefore, the recommendation

that the controller perform the post-audit departs from the model
because the office is not responsible to the legislature.
One proposal made by the Commission was in direct conformity
with the model.

Prompted by the desire to insure an effective force of

state employees and eliminate costly personnel turnover in the state,
the Commission recommended creation of a personnel commission.

The later

controversy over the appointment of the director and the plan submitted
by this commission ultimately eliminated any desirable effects the
commission might have had.
Generally, the recommendations which the reorganization Commission
drafted and submitted to the legislature were adopted.

It should be

noted, however, that those recommendations which were adopted were
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generally technical in character.

Organizational changes affected by

the Commission were slight due primarily to the determination to retain
the original constitutional structure.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
By initiating the three studies of Montana's governmental organi
zation, the legislature indicated an awareness that certain organiza
tional problems existed and all three of the studies confirmed the
existence of these problems.

Surveying the basis upon which each group

made its recommendations, a parallel becomes apparent.

It is evident

that all three studies were dealing with problems having a common origin.
Generally, the problems with which they were dealing emanated

from the

constitutional structure of the executive-administrative branch.
In the early 1900's the multi-headed executive system may have
been adequate but, as the services performed by the state increased in
number and complexity, a corresponding growth in organizational apparatus
was inevitable. State expenditures record this growth,rather dramati
cally.

Total state expenditures in 1920 were only |7,883,531.43.^

Twenty years later, total expenditures had grown five times the amount
of the 1920 figure.
#153,000,000.

2

In 1958, the total state expenditure exceeded

Between 1921 and 1958 there was an increase in Montana

expenditures of over 1800$.^

Administration became vast and complex

^Montana, 1921 Legislative Budget of the State of Montana, p. xxv.
^Figures compiled from the 19Z1 Legislative Budget of the State
of Montana, p. l6.
^Figures compiled from the 1959 Legislative Budget of the State
of Montana, p. 96.
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to handle the functions implicit in this expansion of Montana’s fiscal
outlay.
As the number of administrative units began to grow, responsi
bility for making decisions affecting these units became obscure.
factors contributed to this obscurity:

Two

first, the constitutional

division of executive power among the seven elected officials and the
various boards upon which they sat prevented any direct line of authority
running from the top directly to the bottom of the administrative system.
A second factor contributing to the lack of responsibility lay primarily
in the character of the growing administrative system.

Single adminis

trators with the authority and responsibility for directing the opera
tion of a given administrative unit were not employed.

In their stead,

the legislature in setting up new administrative units applied the
traditional board or commission as the decision making head.

The mem

bers of these commissions were appointed by the governor but usually did
not serve at his pleasure and often served terms longer than the appoint
ing governor.
abbreviated.

Responsibility to the governor as the chief executive was
Isolated pockets of authority grew up and consequently

diffused responsibility became institutionalized.
Important executive tasks allocated by the legislature and the
constitution to the Board of Examiners exemplify the structured diffusion
of authority and responsibility.

Executive functions commonly handled

by the chief executive at the national level of government are performed
in Montana by three popularly elected, state executive officials, having
equal voting power on Board decisions.

Popular election makes the

attorney general and the secretary of state independent of the governor;
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frequent political party difference among the members compounds the
effects of this independent status.

The number of important executive

functions performed by this board has increased.

The legislature, in

an attempt to center responsibility without giving up the traditional
aversion to concentration of authority, has chosen the Board of Examin
ers as the depository of extensive executive power.

The Board presently

administers forty-one different sections of Montana law.

Placing power

in the hands of the Board does not, however, center authority and
responsibility for action— It perpetuates diffusion.
Properly, the function of the chief executive in state government
should be performed by the governor.

Departments headed by officers

responsible to the governor should carry out the administrative policies
of the governor.

Checks and balances between the three branches of

government— legislative, executive, and judicial— has proven to be a
sound approach to a dynamic but controlled government.

However, the

ideological ancestors of checks and balances, Montesquieu, Locke, and
Jefferson, did not conscience the theory of checks and balances within
each branch of the governmental system.

In Montana, the election of

several executive officials, and the creation of administrative boards
with these officials acting in ex officio capacities has, in fact,
created a system of checks and balances internal to the executive branch.
Thus, the execution of laws has devolved to a group of officials
who may, by virtue of being popularly elected, act independently of each
other in the administration of the law.

When these independently

elected officials are joined together on a board to make decisions con
cerning administrative policy, ccmpromise becomes inevitable.
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consequence of this situation, the governor, as chief executive possess
ing supreme executive power, is something of a fiction.

The deficiencies

of a weak chief executive are compounded as the scope of administration
increases in response to the felt needs of the people in Montana.
The Approaches

In Montana, the three major reorganization groups sought, in
various ways, to obviate the problem of diffused authority and responsi
bility in an expanding administrative apparatus.

The 1919 Efficiency

and Trade Commission made an attempt to center the powers of the execu
tive in the governor.

This was to be accomplished by the erection of

a board of administration appointed by the governor to handle many of
the duties formerly performed by the Board of Examiners.

This plan

would have placed the governor in a somewhat more responsible position.
However, the maintenance of the commission type of administrative
system with elected officials continuing to head important administra
tive areas would have frustrated much of what the Board of Administra
tion plan was aimed at achieving.

Because the Commission was disin

clined to recommend constitutional amendments eliminating the Board of
Examiners, the multi-headed administrative boards, and the elected
executive officers, actual centralization of authority in the governor
would have been very limited.
Commission's proposals.

There is a certain irony surrounding this

Though the Commission was reluctant to propose

constitutional amendments to secure a centralized administrative system,
ultimately even the limited plan had to be put before the people in
the form of an amendment.
The second major study performed between 1941 and 1943 by the
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Griffenhagen people resulted, as explained, in two plans.

The first

or basic plan would have involved an extensive alternation of Montana's
executive-administrative system.
cisely to the model plan.

This plan corresponds almost pre

Its adoption would have resulted in the elim

ination of six of the seven elected executive officers ; only the governor
would have been retained.

Under this plan, departmental consolidation

with single administrators responsible to the governor would have
effectively eliminated the present confusion surrounding responsibility
i
and the line of authority in the state's administration. These pro
posals implied a complete revision of the sections in the Montana Con
stitution relating to the executive branch.

The citizen advisory com

mittee did not, however, recommend this plan to the legislature.

A

modified version of the plan, less sweeping in character, was recom
mended.
This second or modified plan retained all the constitutional
officers and institutions.

Generally, the modified plan aimed at

reducing the number of administrative units and at placing similar func
tions in unifunctional departments, headed by the elected state offi
cials.

Within the scope of this plan were reforms directed at strength

ening the governor as the chief executive.

Proposals for transferring

statutory duties from the Board of Examiners to the governor, eliminating
boards aufj commissions from purely administrative tasks, conferring upon
the governor the responsibility for preparing a budget, attempting to
centralize the accounting functions of the state and attempting to
establish at least a limited legislative post-audit were all designed to
center executive functions in the chief executive without altering the
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Montana Constitution.
The proposais offered by the Commission on Reorganization in
1953 were somewhat more limited than those of the two earlier studies.
Some of the reasons for the less sweeping character of the Commission
recommendations have already been given.

Included in the minutes and

the report of this Commission is conclusive evidence that the problems
in the state's administrative structure were the result of diffused
authority and responsibility.

The limited efforts toward reorganization

made by the 1953 Commission were in the direction of ameliorating these
problems.

However, the insistence of retention of boards and commis

sions as administrators continued to retard actual, effective, control
by the governor.

The creation of the inter-departmental advisory

councils was designed to improve the coordination among units of the
government discharging functions similar in nature.
over-all coordination vere neglected.

Proposals for

No recommendation was made for

actual functional integration of agencies into departments with depart
ment heads comprising a coordinated governor's cabinet.

Members of the

Commission expressed an awareness of the problems and a desire to see
the traditional structural deficiencies corrected.

But, the Commission,

for a variety of reasons, did not propose effective reforms to eliminate
the problems which some of its members clearly recognized.
The Opposition and Its Effects
Both the destiny and character of the proposals presented by
these groups were affected hy the opposition to reorganization in
Montana government.

Opposition to changes in the structure of Montana

government can be roughly divided into three classifications.
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First,

nu
there is opposition l^y the affected members of any reorganization scheme.
These people are both administrative officials and elected officials
whose duties, span of control, and general influence may be decreased.
Administrators are reluctant to give up any activity or personnel which,
through the years, they have acquired.

This is not merely the operation

of an administrative ego; many administrators genuinely feel that the
activity which they are performing cannot be properly handled by ai^
other agency or combination of agencies.

They may be in favor of reor

ganization of the state government, but they consider their particular
activity to be, in a word, different.

This response usually issued

from the fact that individual administrators fail to comprehend the
administrative system in its totality.
Opposition from elected officials has at least three manifesta
tions.

If reorganization reduces the areas of activity of an elected

official, his political prestige suffers.

In addition, the official may

also feel that he is performing the tasks of his office adequately and
attempts to remove duties from him are a reflection on his abilities.
If reorganization proposes the abolition of an elected office, these
two aspects of opposition are intensified.

Added to them will be the

realization that elimination of the office destroys a possible political
stepping stone toward other state or national offices.
A second classification of opposition comes from outside the
government.

Interest groups of all kinds have, over a period of time,

established access to the government by a n^iad of institutional and
personal contacts.

Shifting or reorganizing the government may dry up

or alter these channels of access; services formerly performed by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
friends and veil known agencies may, after reorganization, be handled
by a new organization and perhaps different officials.

The rapport

which the interest group has created may be altered or destroyed entirely.
Effctrts toward reallocating duties, responsibilities, and functions
through reorganization may be resolutely opposed by these interest
groups.
A third classification embraces both inter-governmental and extragovernmental opposition.

It is generally conceded that people are reluc

tant to dispose of patterns of activity to which they have became accus
tomed.

In administrative terminology this is called inertia to change.

Perhaps quantitatively this is the most formidable area of opposition.
Several factors contribute to inertia to change.

There is a tendency

to resist a break with tradition, due in part to the general social
sanction given things traditional, and in part from reluctance to permit
disturbances of existing relationships.

Insufficient information con

cerning the need for change also contributes to the lack of support for
reorganization.

Very little has been done in the way of explaining,

on a state-wide basis, the problems in Montana's executive-administra
tive system.

If the citizenry is unaware of the institutional impedi

ments to proper administration, they will not enthusiastically support
proposals for reform.

Indeed, the response to reform will be negative

because the inertia to change phenomenon is extant.
The general character of the proposals submitted by the 1919
committee were affected by the committee's appraisal of the opposition.
Any substantial effort to alter the constitution and achieve centrali
zation of administration was considered impossible by the committee.
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The major reform that the committee did propose vas defeated at the
polls.

This defeat stemmed from several interrelated factors.

The

sudden convening of an extraordinary session of the Legislature did not
allow the Commission time to publicize its reform proposals.

The people

of the state were confronted with a constitutional amendment, the
reasoning behind which had not been thoroughly explained.

There was no

movement of apy significance at the grass roots to support the reform
proposals.

Thus, opposition to the proposals was the only force actively

operating.
The proposals of the Committee on Reorganization and Economy in
1943 were affected by the opposition forces.

Both the advisory committee

and the Griffenhagen firm were aware of the potentially strong opposi
tion to the sweeping character of the first plan.

Because of this

opposition the basic plan was altered; the resultant modified version
was subsequently recommended by the committee.

A member of the committee

reflecting on this procedure pointed out:
I believe that the committee of which I was a member made a mistake
in trying to judge the politics involved and in trying to compromise
so that the committee proposals would be generally accepted «4
However, even the compromise plan failed in the Legislature.

Fundamen

tally the failure stemmed from the fact that the only group actively
advocating reform was the advisory committee.

There was no effective

organization, either in the Legislature or at the grass roots, attempt
ing to achieve enactment of the reform measures.

The opposition had a

rather free hand as Smith pointed out:

^Letter from Russell E. Smith (a member of the advisory committee)
to F. B. Gillette, October 18, 1951.
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. t . the head of every department involved will make vigorous
objection to anything that involves his department . . . every
elective officer will fight to the bitter end to preserve the pre
rogatives of his office. The only way that a Committee on Reorgan
ization can accomplish anything very substantial is to decide upon
a course of action, and then carry their recommendations directly
to the people so that the issues involved in reorganization are
before the people and the legislators at the time of the election.
Unless there is a demand that literally comes from the grass roots,
reorganization bills will have very slight chance of passage because
all the people involved will gang up on every proposal.'
The character of the recommendations submitted by the Commission
on Reorganization in 1953 was affected by the Commission's analysis
of the opposition.

The Commission did not recommend any alteration in

the basic executive-administrative structure.

Members of the Commission

were aware of the underlying problems in Montana's organization but
attempted to avoid offering proposals which would have attracted an
organized opposition.

The failure of the Commission to submit its

drafted proposals (transferring important executive powers from the Board
of Examiners to the governor) indicates the respect that the Commission
had for the opposition forces.

Because the Commission's recommendations

were generally limited in scope, their proposals had greater success
on the floor of the legislature.

However, even this Commission felt

the impact of the opposition on what was perhaps their most significant
recommendation— the personnel commission.

Appointment of a personnel

director repugnant to members of the legislature enabled a coalition
of administrative officials opposed to the personnel commission to
solidify legislative support for abolishing the commission.

The legis

lature destr<^ed the personnel commission by ultimately refusing to

5Ibid.
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appropriate funds for its continuance.

6

If reorganization of Montana's executive-administrative system
is considered desirable (and the creation of the three studies indicates
that some support for reorganization exists), an active force for reform
must be created.

To achieve reorganization, education of the voters

and the legislature is necessary.

The people and the legislature must

be appraised of the administrative problems existent in Montana.

The

merits of alternative administrative plans must be explained, and efforts
made to show how a modern system could be applied in Montana government.
There are several approaches to education of the citizen and the legis
lator regarding the need for reform.

The only effort presently being

made is directed toward the Legislature.

The Legislative Council,

created in 1957, is attempting to study the problems of Montana govern
ment including the problems of state administration.

This group,

composed of members of the Legislature, meets during the interim period
between legislative sessions.
by an executive director.

It has a permanent research staff headed

According to the executive director, reorgani

zation proposals are offered by the research staff to the legislative
members of the council.

The members of the council then have a chance

to survey the recommendation in light of the facts supplied by the staff.
In this way, the council member has a chance to work out in his own
mind the logic of the recommendation.^

^Conversation with
mission and a legislator,
7
Conversation with
Legislative Council, June

Winfield £. Page, a member of the 1953 Com
August 2, I960.
Eugene C. Tidball, executive director of the
22, I960.
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Generally, the Legislative Council staff agrees with the adminis
trative concepts embodied in the Council of State Government’s model
administrative organization.

The Montana Legislative Council, however,

has never formulated and issued a statement of its goals concerning
administrative organization.

In 1959, the council proposed the transfer

of the budget making powers from the controller to the governor and the
legislature enacted this recommendation into law.

Presently, the council

is working on a proposal to transfer the claim approval function from
the Board of Examiners to the governor.°

Both of these proposals are

steps in the direction of the model plan.
The approach of the Legislative Council is somewhat different
than the procedure followed by the three major reorganization studies.
Primarily, the council attempts reorganization in a piecemeal fashion.
Statutory changes are recommended by the council and, through a
Judicious use of the three constitutional amendments each legislative
session, a step by step reorganization is envisioned along the lines
of the model plan.
This approach, however, has serious shortcomings.

No extensive

effort to publicize the desired changes is made by the council.

As a

result, there is no auxiliary citizen movement to augment the council's
attempts at reform.

As pointed out in connection with the three reor

ganization groups, this may be fatal to recommendations for reorgani
zation.

The council relies on its legislative members to clarify and

support its proposals on the floor of the Legislative Assembly.

^Ibid.
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efforts are not assisted by any citizen group appealing to the legisla
tors as a whole for the enactment of reform legislation.

On the other

hand, the opposition elements actively work for the defeat of proposed
reorganization legislation.

Ultimately the success of the Legislative

Council's efforts will rest upon the ability of the council members to
convince the majority of the legislature of the need for reform.

If

they are not successful in this, and there is no supplementary movement
from voter groups, the very existence of the council may be threatened.
If the council proposes an amendment which substantially alters the
executive-administrative structure of the state, the offended adminis
trative and elected officials comprising the opposition may be able to
solidify enough support in the legislature to have the council abolished
or at least restrict its latitude.
Another approach to reorganization lies in the possibility of a
constitutional convention.

Revision of the constitution to implement

modern administrative practices would require a thorough and widespread
educational program.

If such a program were undertaken by various

citizen groups, there is a possibility that the climate for reorganiza
tion might be affected.

A constitutional convention was proposed in

the 1959 Legislative Assembly but was defeated.

Unless there was

extensive and intensive preparation precedent to such a convention, the
ultimate value would be questionable in any case.
The singularly important area where information concerning reor
ganization has been neglected is at the citizen level.

No political

party has campaigned, in recent years, on a platform advocating reform
of Montana's administrative system.

Little activity among Montana
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citizen groupa has ever been undertaken regarding administrative reform.
Until efforts are made in this direction, the opposition to reform will
be able to perpetuate the nineteenth century administrative structure—
they will win by default.
The model plan presented in this paper is derived from the plan
advocated by the Council of State Governments.
This model is based upon the results of over four decades of
administrative research both in government and in business.

It provides

what this writer considers to be the best framework for the logical and
responsible exercise of executive functions in a modern state government.
Generally, the three reorganization commissions submitted pro
posals to the legislature which were somewhat less sweeping than those
embodied in the model plan.

The first study aimed at centralizing state

administration by giving certain powers to a board appointed by the
governor.

It did not propose consolidation of agencies into unifunc

tional departments headed by administrators responsible to the governor.
A planning agency, a personnel agency staff, and clerical assistance
were also neglected in the plan.
The second study completed in 1943 consisted of two plans, the
first of which was almost identical to the model.

However, the second

or modified plan which was ultimately submitted to the Legislature was
quite different from the model.

The basic reason for the divergence

results from the decision to retain the elected executive officers as
the directing heads of administrative departments.
The Report of the Commission on Reorganization in 1953 contained
only one proposal which was in specific conformity with the model.
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was the plan to create a personnel commission to improve the state's
personnel policy.
In the administration of Montana government today only one aspect
of the model plan is actually in operation.

This is the executive

budget instituted by the Legislative Council.

Another feature of the

model, the personnel commission, remains on the Montana statutes but
is inactive.
The three reorganization studies conducted in Montana have
poir.tei out the need for reorganizing the state executive-administra
tive system,

Efech study took a somewhat different approach to the prob-

i.em but generally they concluded that the governor should be given
authority more nearly commensurate with his responsibility.

The feel

ing that the executive branch of government should not continue to
operate under the pall of divided authority and responsibility is grow
ing among legislators.

Efforts by the Legislative Council to explain

the deficiencies inherent in the executive branch have contributed to
the legislators'knowledge of the problems.

A legislative subcommittee

on governmental efficiency has recently approved the idea of a strong
executive with single administrators heading the various state depart
ments and serving at the pleasure of the governor.^

The state of Alaska

has adopted a constitution embracing the model plan for the executive
branch and the other states have administrative systems similar to the
model.
State government today is charged with performing technically

^Ibld.. (conversation)
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intricate activities on a vast scale.

The executive-administrative

branch of government is properly responsible for the efficient and
economical performance of these activities and modern organizational
techniques provide the means whereby these functions can be undertaken.
"Authority— the power to direct" is a necessity if the functions are
to be efficiently performed and democratic government requires that the
directing agent be responsible to the legislature and citizen for that
performance.

Institutional obscurities of authority and responsibility

make it difficult for the citizen or the legislature effectively to
evaluate the executive branch of government.

Effective evaluation of

those responsible for administrative policy and practice is required
ijtt order that the citizen may intelligently execute his democratic
franchise.
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